The Flint, Michigan water crisis was “one of the most significant environmental contamination events in recent American history” because of its blatant negligence that imposed devastation on the residents of Flint. Since the late 19th century, the city of Flint, Michigan has used various sources to bring water into the city. In 1954, a new treatment plant allowed use of treated Flint River water. Although Flint flourished at that time with the growth of the automobile industry, its initial prosperity was built on a shaky foundation of “structural racism”. By the 1960s, the treatment process proved expensive for a city struggling with the loss of jobs and population. Flint’s reliance on a single industry in rapid decline transformed it from an affluent community to a depressed one. Fueled by the flight of wealthier residents seeking jobs elsewhere, it lost a much-needed tax base to support its expensive infrastructure. For that reason, in 1967 city officials began purchasing treated Lake Huron water through the Detroit Water and Sewage Department (DWSD). From that point, the city used a combination of DWSD and treated Flint River water, but the treatment of the Flint River water only occurred periodically. By 2013, due to additional financial concerns, Flint city officials decided to use only Flint River water, treating it through their own Flint Water Service Center (FWSC). An emergency manager from the Michigan state government supported the switch.

Despite concerns from water specialists, in April 2014 city officials made the switch even though prior to that local changeover, “Sufficient pilot testing and corrosion studies were not commissioned and completed… Furthermore, since the Flint plant had not been fully operational in almost 50 years, was understaffed, and some of the staff were undertrained, it is not surprising that it was difficult to achieve effective treatment.” The abrupt change without sufficient monitoring proves particularly concerning given the variability of the Flint River water composition, which demands greater attention and monitoring than water from other, more stable sources such as Lake Huron. Variable water sources can experience quick changes in water chemistry which in turn hinder water quality as well as the condition of the water pipes.

Flint residents began reporting concerns about water quality in May 2014, soon after the switch in their water source. They noticed changes in the odor, taste, and color of the water coming through their faucets. In particular, discoloration included a red tinge, which is associated with iron corrosion. In addition, many parents reported skin rashes on their children. Even the local General Motors Corporation reported that the water was corroding its engine parts, requiring them to change their water source from the city of Flint. By the summer of 2014, water testing revealed higher than acceptable levels of E. Coli, trihalomethane concentrations, lead, and other harmful chemicals. Trihalomethanes are a type of chemical known as a disinfection byproduct. They form in drinking water treated with disinfectants, typically chlorine. These chemicals can cause many health problems, including cancer. For that reason, chlorine levels demand careful and frequent monitoring. The trihalomethane content far exceeded levels allowed through the federal Safe Drinking Water Act, but they went unchecked by both federal and state governments for months.

In addition to those contaminants, during the summers of 2014 and 2015, 91 cases of Legionellosis were reported. Legionellosis, a form of pneumonia, attacks the lungs and can spread through infected drinking water. Although a direct link to the Flint River water was not determined unequivocally, the number of diagnosed illnesses increased dramatically after the water source switch, continuing well into 2015. In addition, despite obvious signs, adequate lead testing did not occur until the summer of 2015, more than a year after the water source switch. At that time, coordinated reports from engineers and activists who organized a lead-testing campaign exposed how the corrosive water eroded the lead pipes of Flint’s faulty infrastructure. Still, officials did not implement adequate corrections for another few months.

Insufficient monitoring and treatment created a myriad of problems in Flint. For example, adequate chlorine monitoring equipment had not been installed, and chlorination and fluoridation of the water was not properly regulated. Further, “The water utility did not have a corrosion-control plan…” Improper filters, treatment, and monitoring all led to the crisis. Additional concerns involved residual amounts of contaminants, especially lead, even after the switch back. All of those represent basic elements of water infrastructure; yet, blatant negligence occurred in Flint, rendering infrastructural violence to its vulnerable residents. Despite their complaints, they remained powerless, dependent on a government that was not looking out for their best interests.